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Abstract
　The recent ongoing tariff war between the U.S. and China over what 
U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration define as intellectual 
property rights (IPR) violations among other unfair trade practices by 
China will likely continue escalating in the months to come, making a 
significant impact not only on the subject economies, but potentially 
expediting the next world economic recession. 
　This paper examines the reasons why the tariff war between the U.S. 
and China began, how it has escalated, the possible scenarios of how it 
may play out in the near future, and the potential impacts it may have on 
world economies under the assumption that it exacerbates a global 
economic recession. The paper also attempts to identify who may be the 
winners and losers in this standoff, what ramifications the conflict will 
have on conventional trade partners, and what the potential strategic 
diversification among those partners maybe in the future.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Reasoning behind the U.S. tariffs against China
　The short history behind U.S. president Donald Trump’s tariff war 
began as part of his “America First” economic policy in order to reduce 
the U.S. trade deficit with several countries by shifting American trade 
policy from multilateral cooperation agreements to bilateral solutions 
(Jansen, Mildner & Ross, 2020). One of President Trump’s 2016 election 
campaign promises was to reduce the trade imbalance with various 
countries, in particular, China. In 2017, the U.S. exported 18.3% of its 
products and services to Canada, 15.7% to Mexico, 8.5% to China, and 
4.4% to Japan (CIA, 2019). Primary export commodities included 
agricultural products (soybeans, fruit, corn, etc.) 9.2%, industrial 
supplies (organic chemicals, etc.) 26.8%, capital goods (transistors, 
aircraft, motor vehicle parts, computers, telecommunications equipment, 
etc.) 49.0%, and consumer goods (automobiles, medicines, etc.) 15.0%. 
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By the end of 2017, the U.S. imported 21.6% from China, 13.4% from 
Mexico, 12.8% from Canada, 5.8% from Japan, and 5% from Germany 
(CIA, 2019). Meanwhile, China exported US$2.216 trillion in 2017, but 
imported only US$1.74 trillion in the same year. Import partners 
included: South Korea 9.7%, Japan 9.1%, U.S. 8.5%, Germany 5.3%, 
and Australia 5.1% (CIA, 2019). 
1.2 What’s at stake in the standoff
　In 2018, the U.S. imported US$539 billion in commodities from 
China, while China imported only US$120.3 billion in goods from the 
U.S. (Figure 1; Bartash, 2019). The U.S. Census trade figures reveal that 
the U.S. has been a net importer from China in most market segments, 
including industrial supplies, apparel, furniture, and consumer 
electronics products. In contrast, the U.S. exported a much smaller 
figure of US$120.3 billion in goods to China in 2018, which fell from 
almost US$130 billion in 2017. This was partly due to China greatly 





China fell to US$5.9 billion in 2018 from US$15.9 billion in 2017 
(Bartash, 2019).  
　In January, 2018, the U.S. government imposed significant import 
tariffs on steel and aluminum products, including thousands of those 
coming from China. In response, the European Union, Canada, China, 
and other countries retaliated with tariffs of their own, primarily focusing 
on U.S. agricultural and other politically sensitive sectors (Kearney, 
2018). The U.S. government, Gonzales (2018) notes, imposed 30 to 
50% tariffs on solar panels and washing machines in the same month, 
while Horsley (2018) confirms it added 25% tariffs on steel and 10% 
tariffs on aluminum in March, 2018. In the following month, under 
orders from the Trump administration, the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) published a list subjecting an additional duty of 25% on products 
imported from China that were subject to additional tariffs, and three 
months later China introduced anti-dumping tariffs on US-grown 
sorghum. At the same time, the US administration published a tariff list 
of 1,333 Chinese products with an import value of US$50 billion (Zolle-
Rydzek, Felbermayr, 2018).  
1.3 Section 232 and 301 Tariffs
　One of the tariffs President Trump imposed on Chinese products is 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gives the 
president the authority to enforce tariffs on national security grounds, 
and is product specific, meaning certain products can be heavily taxed 
because of national security concerns. It is placed on certain types of 
commodity steel and aluminum temporarily, and without regard to the 
country of origin (ST&R, 2019). Another promulgated tariff is Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which applies to fair trade rationale and is 
country-specific. Section 301 has only been placed on China 
contemporarily and features a long list of products that are manufactured 
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in that country (ST&R, 2019). This was the first time Section 301 has 
been filed against any country since 1997. 
1.4 The Rationale behind the tariffs
　ST&R (2019) reported an investigation by the Trump administration 
that determined China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology 
transfer, IPR espionage, and innovation are unreasonable and 
discriminatory. The U.S. policy was designed to stop or at least limit 
American and Chinese nationals from transferring U.S. technology and 
intellectual property rights to Chinese enterprises. It also limits Chinese 
manufactured products from being imported into the U.S. as the Trump 
administration believes the Chinese government has relentlessly 
performed unfair, illegal, and undermining acts which merely bolster its 
intention of seizing world economic leadership in advanced technology, 
as set forth in its “Made in China 2025”. This policy emphasizes a 
strategic plan originated by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and his cabinet 
in May 2015 that outlines China’s plan to move away from being the 
world’s “factory” and seeking dominance in global hi-tech manufacturing 
(USTR, 2018). Pillsbury (2016) writes that China “engages in the 
counterfeiting of non-Chinese products on a large scale, including the 
unauthorized production, distribution, or use of products and their 
design or key technologies via unauthorized means, without permission” 
(p. 175). In a speech to the National Association of Manufacturers, 
former minister counselor at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, Thomas 
Boam, asserted that “10 to 30% of China’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is founded on pirated and counterfeited products” (Shenkar, 
2006, p. 102). According to a recent U.S. government report from the 
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, China is described 
as “the world’s most active and persistent perpetrator of economic 
espionage” (ONCIX, 2011). China collects sensitive economic 
information (including trade secrets, patented processes, business plans, 
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cutting-edge technologies, and export-controlled commodities) to 
support its domestic industries using traditional and cyber-based 
methods of collection, with the latter being the most robust in the world 
(Pillsbury, 2016).
　Amongst all this punitive tariff bickering, perhaps the real underlying 
question needed to be addressed is what the U.S. government’s true 
intentions are towards China. In a recent interview, Kishore Mahbubani, 
Singaporean academic, former diplomat and current Distinguished 
Fellow at the National University of Singapore, stated that the goal of 
this trade war is to stop China from becoming the number one economy 
in the world. He believes that the U.S. is trying to decouple its economy 
from China’s in order to impede China’s rapid economic growth. People 
are not sure whether this is purely a trade war or a much larger geopolitical 
contest. Mahbubani assumes it is the latter (Lee, 2019). The U.S. is no 
doubt apprehensive about losing its status as the world’s dominant 
economic power that it has enjoyed for nearly a century, but looking 
back on history, it is inevitable for this change to occur no matter what 
tactics it applies against China or any other country. Szirmai (2010) 
writes that Britain was formerly the model of a developed and modern 
society in the 19th century. The U.S. took over that position in the 20th 
century, then Japan in the 1980’s. An emerging China, in the course of 
the 21st century, might very well become the next model of modernity. 
2. China’s reasoning behind its tariff retaliation and 
view of the U.S.
2.1 China’s demands and position
　Jain & Saraswat (2019) note that China has been a strong global 
economic contender that follows its own national interests vigilantly. 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Commerce in China stated the position of 
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the country to be very clear in its declaration that they do not want to 
fight, but are not afraid to fight a trade war. The Chinese side will persist 
to the end and not hesitate to pay any price, taking a new comprehensive 
response to firmly defend the interests of its people (Swanson, Bradsher, 
2018). Moreover, Shalal (2019) noted that China listed three main 
demands in its trade negotiations with Washington:
　1)  the removal of all imposed tariffs
　2)  the reduction of U.S. product imports so that the countries can 
reduce their trade imbalance
　3)  the need for a “balanced” text for all trade deals in the future.  
A general consensus has grown among Chinese officials that depicts the 
U.S. government as simply using IPR as an excuse to contain China. 
The consensus asserts that Beijing believes banning operations for 
companies such as Huawei in North America and ignoring all the 
progress China has made is unfair (Cia, 2018). In addition, Cia writes 
that Chinese president Xi Jinping and his administration claim that 
American companies have made huge profits in the Chinese market, but 
neither party can continue achieving progress if the U.S. has no goodwill. 
Chinese officials have promised that the country will continue to improve 
its IPR protection, but this will be to serve its own interests and not 
because it is bowing to U.S. pressure (Cia, 2018). Trading market access 
for technology dates back to Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to 
launch reform and open-up policies, Cia adds, but it was not until after 
China became a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) in the 1980s that it began enforcing laws to bolster its intellectual 
property structure. Concurrently, Blair et al., (2017) write in the Report 
of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, IP 
Commission Report, that the annual cost of Chinese theft of American 
IPR continues to exceed US$225 billion in counterfeit goods, theft of 
trade secrets, and pirated software that could be as high as US$600 
billion annually. In addition, the Office of the Director of National 
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Intelligence in November 2015 estimated that economic espionage 
through hacking costs the U.S. US$400 billion per year, and at this pace, 
the U.S. has suffered over US$1.2 trillion in economic damage since the 
original IP Commission Report was published in May, 2013 (Blair et al., 
2017). The Chinese government has relentlessly denied U.S. accusations 
that it has been negligent about following IPR protection laws, alleged 
intellectual property theft, and forced technology transfer (Cia, 2018). 
Furthermore, China believes there is no common understanding on the 
IPR issue, therefore, it will do nothing to address “problems that do not 
exist”, and from its perspective, has made great progress in improving 
its domestic IPR protection protocol amongst a reputation for piracy and 
counterfeits of numerous brands, such as New Balance shoemaker, 
Disney and Universal Studio characters, and Apple products (Cia, 2018). 
2.2 China requires joint ventures to access its market
　Foreign firms have complained for many years that, despite enforcing 
their IPR in China, violations have been difficult to control due to the 
country’s judicial protectionism, which challenges the acquisition of 
evidence and a perceived bias against foreign firms operating there. 
Sourabh Gupta, a senior Asia-Pacific international relations policy 
specialist with the China-American Studies in Washington, claims that 
one of the main reasons China has been able to acquire foreign 
technology so quickly is that it requires overseas companies wishing to 
open or expand in 35 sectors of the country to do so through joint 
ventures, as the government procurement law favors goods and services 
from domestic companies (Cia, 2018). In 2018, the EU filed a complaint 
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) against China for requiring 
European companies to transfer valuable technology to Chinese 
companies in exchange for market access. Forced technology transfers 
already intensified tensions between China and other major economies, 
and China’s response to the pending ruling could have serious 
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consequences for the global economy (CSIS, 2020).  Gupta claimed that 
by design or accident, the risk of losing know-how and technology is 
aggravated when the Chinese joint venture partner maintains parallel 
operations within the same business line that competes with the joint 
venture operation (Cia, 2018). Patrick Mendis, an associate-in-research 
at the Fairbank Centre for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, 
declared that China has regulated a number of IPR protection 
mechanisms, but the question remaining is how effective are they in 
applying them. For China to achieve its own policy goals for the ‘Made 
in China 2025’ initiative, it must demonstrate that it will do what it says 
it will do, meaning honor its policy of IPR protection mechanisms (Cia, 
2018). Nevertheless, from China’s perspective, the country claims it 
does not violate WTO rules on IPR, and it has already updated its 
policies to be in line with them.
2.3 The Evil Twin
　What the U.S. and other western governments may underestimate is 
the Chinese government’s refusal to comply with what western countries 
condone as fair, proper and legal international trade practice. Some 
economists believe that it may be more practical for the U.S. government 
to settle on whatever small victories it can achieve with Beijing and get 
back to the bargaining table before the tariff escalation exacerbates into 
a worldwide recession. This leads to the question of why the Chinese 
government is so unwilling to cooperate with western trade ideals, in 
particular, those led by the US regarding WTO rules on IPR. Pillsbury 
(2016), explains that China has a history of mistrusting the U.S.:
The Chinese government created, in effect, an extensive ‘alternate 
history’ of Sino-American relations, which portrayed the U.S. as 
something approximating an evil twin of its actual self, continually 
working to undermine the Chinese people, even as, in reality, 
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Americans worked to strengthen China. An emerging generation 
of the Chinese people now believes a totally different narrative 
about the U.S. than the one most Americans know—one that states 
that for 170 years America has tried to dominate China (Pillsbury, 
2016 pp. 100, 101). 
Pillsbury (2016) adds that “China depicts American national heroes, 
including Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt, 
as ‘evil masterminds’ who manipulated Chinese officials and others to 
weaken China” (p.101).  At least to some extent, this twisted view of 
history distorts their current vision of Sino-American “cooperation,” 
with many seeing it as just a passing phase in American’s enduring 
crusade to destroy China’s rightful place in the world. In an interview 
about his book, Pillsbury stated that he has come to realize the U.S. has 
been wrong from the beginning about who has really managed whom. 
The U.S. has been the pawn of China because it got a lot of benefits 
from their trade and investment. The Chinese have been managing 
the U.S. much more than the U.S. has managed them. Their concept 
of the new global order will be handled by a consensus, not by 
pressure groups from what China perceives as unusual concerns 
with American values. The key point about the new Chinese-led 
global order is America will NOT be a global leader. The removal 
of the U.S., as what they call the hegemon, is the most important 
thing (Warner, interview with Pillsbury, Feb. 25th, 2015).  
With the U.S. government out of China’s economic decision-making 
picture, the Chinese government would then be in a position to dictate 
how they want global economics to function and not how other countries 
such as the U.S want China to function. The thought of this scenario 
becoming a reality is preposterous to the U.S. and most other World 
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Trade Organization (WTO) members.  
3. The Tariff war escalates, potential scenarios
3.1 Moody’s Investment Service emphasized the risk 
　Following the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(OUSTR) section 301 investigation, president Trump further announced 
in March, 2018, that the U.S. would impose tariffs on approximately 
US$50 billion worth of Chinese import sectors, including aerospace, 
information and communication technology, robotics, and machinery. 
The proposed list covered roughly 1,300 separate tariff lines and 
underwent further review in a public notice and comment process, 
including a hearing (OUSTR, 2018b). In retaliation to the above, the 
Chinese government, in March 2018, imposed tariffs ranging from 15 to 
25% on 128 different U.S. products, including pork, fruit, nuts, wine, 
stainless steel pipes, recycled aluminum and modified ethanol, among 
others items (Bryan, 2018). According to a statement from the Chinese 
government, the tariffs would apply to about US$3 billion worth of 
goods annually while it argued that the Trump administration’s use of 
national security as the basis for tariffs on steel and aluminum was a 
smokescreen and the restrictions were economic-based, making their 
retaliation legal under WTO rules (Bryan, 2018). As of September 1st, 
2019, the trade war between the U.S. and China entered a new, dangerous 
phase with Presidents Trump and Xi imposing duties on more than half 
of the two countries’ trade in commodities, and additional tariff measures 
which took effect by the end of the year. Nicolaci da Costa (2019) notes 
that Moody’s Investment Service emphasized the risk of an ongoing tit-
for-tat war has spiked, posing danger to the firm’s 2020 forecasts for 6% 
GDP growth in China and 1.7% GDP growth in the U.S. The firm has 
devised three likely outcomes from recent trade tensions and negotiations 
(Figure 2). Under scenario one, no trade deal happens, but no further 
　 136 　
国研紀要156 （2020.10）
escalation of tensions takes place and the threat of 25% tariffs on all 
imports from China is never implemented. Under scenario two, the U.S. 
and China impose 25% tariffs on all imports from each other and trade 
remains a contentious issue (Nicolaci da Costa, 2019). Under this 
scenario, Moody’s expects that the impact on economic activity would 
be more severe, cutting an additional 0.3 percentage points from the 
total. Nicolaci da Costa (2019) writes that unfortunately, Moody’s 
believes the latest negotiations make scenario two the most likely to 
become a reality. Although the escalating trade conflict had mostly 
spared U.S. and Chinese consumers until the end of 2019, Zandi, Rogers 
and Cosma (2019) emphasize that roughly US$125 billion of Chinese 
imports were slapped with tariffs in September 2019 while those on the 
first US$250 billion in Chinese imports rose from 25 to 30% in October, 
2019. The remaining 15% tariff on US$160 billion worth of consumer 
goods was scheduled to take place on December 15th, 2019 with the 
brunt of these duties falling on consumers (Zandi, Rogers, Cosma, 
2019). Luckily a break in negotiations occurred on January 15th, 2020, 
during the Phase One talks. Before that, the U.S. Finance Ministry 
announced on August 23rd, 2019 that China raised tariffs on US$75 
billion of U.S. products, including auto exports, and curtail purchases of 
U.S. agriculture goods in retaliation, deepening a conflict over trade and 
technology that threatened to edge a weakening global economy into a 
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potential world recession (McDonald, 2019). 
4. Potential impact on the U.S. economy
4.1 Cease next tariffs until the Christmas shopping season is over
　Lobosco (2019) believes that the outcome of this trade war with China 
means U.S. import companies will have to pay more for intermediate 
product imports, making their end products more costly for U.S. 
consumers and less competitive in global markets. Lobosco adds that 
while trade negotiations are ongoing, Chinese President Xi Jinping and 
President Donald Trump had been imposing retaliatory tariffs for over a 
year and a half since they started in January, 2018, and businesses in 
both countries have been bearing the brunt of the damage. On August 
23rd, 2019, Beijing threatened another round of duties on US$75 billion 
of US-made goods in response to President Trump’s promise earlier that 
month to impose tariffs on US$300 billion of Chinese goods. However, 
Trump later relented and agreed to hold off on most of those tariffs until 
December 15th, 2019 to avoid affecting American Christmas shoppers 
(Lobosco, 2019). The trade war had already caused significant economic 
damage up to that point, costing an estimated 0.3 percentage point in 
U.S. 2019 real GDP, and almost 300,000 jobs. Meanwhile, the tariffs 
have impacted prices on consumer products, including luggage, baseball 
caps, bicycle parts, iPhones, laptops, sneakers and clothing. JPMorgan 
Chase announced that the latest tariffs cost the average American family 
US$1,000 a year, and the company warned President Trump against 
expanding the trade war with China to include tariffs on a wider swath 
of consumer goods, including video game consoles, TVs and apparel 
(Egan, 2019). JPMorgan Chase equity strategist Dubravko Lakos-Bujas 
claimed the tariffs will significantly impact the wallets of U.S.consumers 
ahead of the 2020 presidential election, and eliminate most of the 
benefits households received from Republican tax cuts (Egan, 2019). 
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4.2 U.S. Midwest farmers taking the brunt of tariffs
　U.S. agriculture, food distribution, and other related industries felt the 
initial brunt of the 
Chinese tariffs. These 
industries as a whole 
contributed US$1.053 
trillion to U.S. GDP in 
2017, a 5.4% share, 
with the output of 
America’s farms 
contributing US$132.8 
billion of this sum, 
which equals about 
one percent of overall GDP (Lobosco, 2019). Farmers in the Midwest, 
who are already suffering losses from severe weather and flooding for 
the sixth consecutive year, felt a further downtrend in 2019 due to 
decreases in agricultural exports, primarily to China, due to their 
overdependence on the country. According to a 2019 study from the 
University of Wisconsin–Madison, Wisconsin’s farms and agricultural 
businesses generated US$104.8 billion in economic activity and created 
437,700 jobs in 2017, an increase from a 2012 study that found 
agriculture generated US$88.3 billion in economic activity and 413,500 
jobs in the state (Kolb, 2019). Wisconsin ranks first in the nation for 
snap beans for processing, cheese, cranberries, ginseng, mink pelts, dry 
whey (for humans), milk goats and corn for silage, and is home to 64,793 
farms on 14.3 million acres (Kolb, 2019). However, according to Tom 
Bressner, advisor with the Wisconsin Agriculture Business Association:
Although Midwest farmers exported 1.6 million metric tons of 
soybean grain to China in 2015, only 600,000 are expected by the 
end of 2019 (62.5% drop) mostly due to the tariff war (Figure 3). 
Figure 3  
Bressner, 2019 
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Moreover, Midwest farmers exported 350,000 metric tons of corn 
gluten meal in 2014 compared to only 20,000 metric tons in 2019 
(94.3% drop), and 400,000 metric tons of corn grain in 2015 versus 
100,000  for  2019 (75% drop) (T. Bressner, personal communication, 
August 21, 2019). 
Wisconsin and other mid-west farmers, meanwhile, will have to quickly 
find ways to divert their export targets of soy, corn and other produce to 
different countries to compensate for their lost business with China. 
Jeremy Fokltz, Professor and Chair of the Department of Agriculture 
and Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, states 
that subsidies from the federal government to help cover the sixth 
consecutive year of financial loss for Midwest farmers will not be 
enough to weather the tariff storm. Many farmers will not have markets 
for their products and could suffer further losses and bankruptcies. 
U.S. farmers traditionally have produced far more agriculture 
goods than American citizens can possibly consume, and up till 
now their exports have been driven by world markets, in particular 
China’s. However, with China changing its import target from the 
U.S. to South America, U.S. farmers will have no choice but to 
quickly diversify their sales routes in order to compensate for this 
significant loss (J. Fokltz, personal communication, August 21st, 
2019). 
With chances of a global recession looming, efforts to decrease risk by 
moving away from dependency on China should have ideally begun 
years ago. Fokitz (2019) adds that from the Chinese perspective, there’s 
little reason to follow demands from the Trump administration. In 
theory, the U.S. tariffs designed to get the Chinese to heel and behave 
better were thought to have worked, but what Washington wants has 
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been unclear due to shifting messages from Trump saying one thing one 
day and retracting or changing his thoughts the next. 
I expect that what we will see is China continuing its bans on 
imports of U.S. agricultural goods among others, and the boats that 
used to be filled with U.S. made soy beans and corn can just as 
easily come from Argentina or Brazil. Once you dig that trench, 
things start to flow easily, so trying to win back China to better 
things now may be too little, too late (J. Fokltz, personal 
communication, August 21st, 2019).
　After Trump’s presidential campaign for the 2016 election, 70% of 
swing state Wisconsin farmers broke from their traditional democratic 
stance and voted for him, the first republican candidate since Ronald 
Reagan in 1984. Critics say that Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton 
did not focus enough energy in Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania 
swing states during her campaign. Fokitz added that after Trump became 
president and began his harsh stance towards China, the amount of time 
spent negotiating with uncertainty and changing messages means much 
less production output as farmers and exporters remain uncertain about 
government trade policies and tariffs. Despite that Midwest farmers are 
taking the brunt of China’s retaliatory tariffs; they continue to show their 
support for Washington’s aggressive approach towards the country. 
Other rustbelt state industries seem to feel the same, putting their hopes 
behind Trump to regain lost business that drifted overseas with the past 
several presidents. Wayne Chmiel, Vice President of New Business 
Development at Metal Tek International, explained his reasoning behind 
the traditional democratic Midwest corporate change to support 
republican candidate Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election:
The voter base who picked Trump was the distant franchise that 
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was ignored by the republicans’ and democrats’ mainstream 
candidates. Globalization took manufacturing jobs from the rust 
belt of the Midwest, and one of those key states which swung the 
Trump vote was Wisconsin. Although applying tariffs to call China 
up on its IPR espionage among other things may be a simple, 
obvious approach, Trump is the first president to take a blatant 
stand against China, whereas former presidents after Richard 
Nixon overlooked China’s IPR violations for economic gain at the 
time (W. Chmiel, personal communication, August 28th, 2019).
　Regarding burdens on electronic consumer products, Fokitz (2019) 
believes that up until now, Walmart and other retail stores have done an 
excellent job of getting made-in-China products to the U.S. consumer at 
rock-bottom prices, but now that the Trump administration has greatly 
hindered this process through escalating tariffs, consumers will see an 
obvious jump in commodity prices in 2020 that could continue at least 
in the short-term unless something is done.  In a surprising turn of events 
and relief to experts’ predictions of the year end tariffs threats, on 
December 13th, 2019, the U.S. and China agreed to lay out the details for 
the Phase One trade deal just before they originally planned the 
December 15th, 2019 tariff hike that would have affected the majority of 
consumer goods including popular electronic items such as laptops and 
smartphones. Details at that time revealed that the Trump administration 
would not proceed with 15% tariffs on US$160 billion worth of 
consumer goods and reduced the September 1st tariffs for US$120 
billion of Chinese goods, cutting them from 15% to 7.5%. In contrast, 
the 25% tariffs for US$250 billion of Chinese imports will continue, 
with further potential reductions depending on progress in future trade 
negotiations (OUSTR, 2019). The decision to reduce tariffs on popular 
Chinese electronics products was the result of China’s agreement to 
increase the purchase of U.S. products and services by at least US$200 
　 142 　
国研紀要156 （2020.10）
billion over the next two years, suspend retaliatory tariffs, have a tariff 
exclusion process plan ready, and implement intellectual property 
safeguards (OUSTR, 2019).  OUSTR adds that China also agreed to 
import US$40 to 50 billion worth of US agricultural products within the 
next two years. It appeared that both sides finally agreed that tariff 
escalation was producing no significant winner and that the countries 
can gain more through compromise, in particular, by China implementing 
the stronger WTO based IPR safeguards which the Trump Administration 
requested, while the U.S. reduces tariffs on popular Chinese electronics 
and OEM products.
4.3 Some companies taking a different approach
　Some U.S. companies have been utilizing different approaches. 
Milwaukee Tool in Brookfield, Wisconsin, outsourced its entire parts 
production to Chinese suppliers in the mid 1980’s for cheaper labor, but 
recently moved back to the Milwaukee area due to the recent negative 
ramifications from the tariffs. Bressner (2019) noted that Milwaukee 
Tool later claimed that the tariffs were a blessing in disguise as they 
brought business back home and the company became a positive 
example for other U.S. manufacturers to reduce their dependence on 
Chinese labor. Although a considerable number of U.S. firms are indeed 
moving out of China, not all are flocking back to the U.S., undermining 
the central promise of Trump’s trade war. According to Behsudi & 
Birminghan (2019), the countries benefiting the most amid the trade war 
are those with cheaper labor markets in Southeast Asia. Inspections for 
U.S. companies increased 21% in Vietnam, 25% in Indonesia and 15% 
in Cambodia. Mexican inspections for U.S. clients jumped by a 
staggering 119% in the first six months of 2019. On the other hand, 
Lobosco (2019) claimed that in August, 2019, Beijing said it would put 
tariffs back on American-made cars and trucks which would penalize 
U.S. companies only for the cars they export to China. In 2017, about 
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15% of America’s auto exports, worth about US$9.5 billion, were sold 
in China. As a result, the Association of Global Automakers (AGA) 
immediately issued a statement in August, 2019, warning auto 
manufacturers that Beijing’s duties could result in a severe drop in 
exports. John Bozzella, president and CEO of AGA, added that if those 
tariffs remain in effect, jobs in the U.S. will no doubt be at risk (Lobosco, 
2019). How quickly U.S. auto makers can diversify their export channels 
or Washington reduces tariff penalties on Chinese auto parts 
manufacturers should help determine the time and scale of price 
increases in U.S. auto sales. 
5. Potential impact on the Chinese economy
5.1 China shifts soybean and corn imports from South America
　According to the 
American Farm 
Bureau Federation, in 
2018, China purchased 
an astounding 62% of 
global soybeans, with 
the top three exporters 
being the U.S., Brazil, 
and Argentina
(Glibertie, 2019). The 
Chinese use corn for 
ethanol and food products, and soybean meal and grain to feed their 
enormous hog population which is highly popular in Chinese cuisine. 
However, in 2019, in retaliation to U.S. tariffs placed on Chinese exports, 
the country shifted a large share of soybeans imports from the U.S. to 
Brazil (Figure 4), which allegedly has been one of the main reasons for 
massive fires in the Amazon throughout 2019 (to clear land for increased 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service Analysis of China 




soy farms). Regardless, Gilbertie (2019) asserts that China still needs 
significant imports of soybeans from the U.S.
No two countries alone can supply China’s cumulative need for 
soybeans and soy products, and the country will eventually pay for 
its mistake for making the U.S. farmer a target of its wrath: China 
needs the American farmer, friend or foe, to fulfill its agricultural 
needs. Much of that harm will befall its own people who need U.S. 
soybeans and will eventually have little choice but to pay tariff-
inflated prices to have enough for themselves and their animals to 
eat (Gilbertie, 2019).
5.2 China automotive parts and OEM manufacturers suffer 
　As briefly noted above, the Chinese automotive parts manufacturing 
sector has been strongly affected by U.S. tariffs. Rita Xiao, Chongqing 
Bona Auto Parts export manager, admitted that the U.S. tariffs have 
caused the company’s exports to decrease by roughly 20% since October, 
2018 (Behsudi, Bermingham, 2019). Chongqing Bona is one of 
thousands of auto parts manufacturers based near Chongqing, in the 
southwest of China, which is home to Changan Ford, a joint venture of 
the state-owned carmaker. The company employs more than 23,000 
people and sells mainly to the Chinese market. Xiao warned that if new 
U.S. tariffs on the global auto industry are announced, it will definitely 
intensify the already heavy impact on Chongqing Bona. U.S. partners 
and clients from other countries will all ask for lower prices, which is 
infeasible for the company (Behsudi, Bermingham, 2019). 
　Huifeng (2018) notes that another hard-hit business sector in China 
from ongoing tariffs is original equipment manufacturing (OEM). Much 
of China’s economic base is built on a system of OEM, which is a 
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network of low-cost and highly flexible suppliers in sectors ranging 
from textiles to smartphones to toys. Assemblers of electronics products 
are the biggest companies in China’s OEM system, and account for nine 
of the country’s top 10 exporters in 2017 (Huifeng, 2018). According to 
AskCI Consulting Company Ltd, OEM products are mostly designed by 
EU and U.S. companies and sold under their corporate labels. The U.S. 
imposed a 25% tariff on over 800 categories of Chinese goods worth 
US$550 billion, including nearly every component that goes into the 
manufacture of any piece of electronic hardware, from capacitors to 
resistors, microcontrollers to semiconductors, and the raw components 
that go into printed circuit boards (Huifeng, 2018). A Chinese CEO 
executive of OEM production asserted that:    
     
China’s assembly and manufacturing systems are irreplaceable in 
the U.S. consumer electronics market, but Beijing would never use 
this as a bargaining chip. While it would mean more expensive 
TVs, mobile phones and smart devices for Americans, it would 
equally mean massive closures and lay-offs at Chinese factories 
(Huifeng, 2018).    
　For China, reducing America’s heavy reliance on the country for so 
much of its manufacturing needs is a frightening scenario. Novak (2019) 
asserts that the U.S. is still the number one consumer market in the 
world, and it is now actively looking elsewhere for other import countries 
to make up for its lost business with China. Consequently, China needs 
to come up with a promising offer to slow this trend down either through 
negotiations or in some kind of arrangement with U.S. manufacturers 
that are still in China. Tariffs obviously added a great burden on the 
Chinese economy (Figure 5), which only grew 6.2% year-on-year in the 
second quarter of 2019, the slowest pace in nearly 30 years, despite an 





businesses in the 
country are finding 
ways to remain 
resilient even if it 
means having to 
absorb the costs of 
tariffs. Cheng (2019) 
notes that Wei 
Jianhua, former vice minister at the Ministry of Commerce, is convinced 
the China-U.S. trade tensions are a long-term situation. As the Chinese 
side awaits a fair and equal trade deal, the country has made preparations 
to counter any negative impact from trade tensions (Cheng, 2019).
5.3 China’s four ways to bolster its businesses:
　Cheng (2019) writes that Wei laid out four ways in which China can 
bolster its own businesses:
　1. Increasing government support
　2.	 A Beijing-led massive infrastructure project of opening channels 
to other international markets through programs such as free trade 
zones and the Belt and Road Initiative
　3.	 Developing a higher-quality operating environment for state-
owned and foreign enterprises
　4.	 Implementing policies such as tax and fee cuts.
　Wei added that some Chinese companies were absorbing the cost of 
the U.S. tariffs, but not all, and most businesses were waiting for further 
resolutions to trade talks while some with tariff supply exposure were 
considering moving their sourcing (Cheng, 2019). If all of the Trump 
administration’s threatened tariff hikes had been put in place by mid-
December, 2019, the average tariff rate on U.S. imports of Chinese 
Figure 5  
(Jiefei, 2019) 
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products would be about 24%, up from 3% two years ago, while Chinese 
imports of U.S. goods would be at nearly 26% compared with China’s 
average tariff rate of 6.7% for all other countries (Weijian, 2019). 
Luckily the U.S. and China’s so-called Phase One deal announced on 
January 15th, 2020, revealed that China agreed to purchase additional 
US goods and services over the next two years, in particular agriculture 
products such as soybeans, pork, cotton and wheat, resulting in total 
exports to China of over US$260 billion for 2020, and roughly US$310 
billion for 2021 (Toh, 2020). In addition to the purchases, Toh notes that 
the phase one deal provides better protection to U.S. companies that 
have long complained about China’s IPR theft, and loosens up 
requirements for banks who wish to imposes anti-counterfeiting 
measures. In response, the Trump administration has agreed to halve 
tariffs on US$120 billion of Chinese products from 15% to 7.5%, while 
future phase two negotiations may roll back U.S. tariffs of 25% on 
US$250 billion worth of Chinese products (Lawder, Shalal & Mason, 
2020).
6. Impact on the Japanese economy
6.1 U.S.-China tariff war creates negative results for 
Japanese economy
　The results of the U.S. - China tariff war has had a negative impact on 
the Japanese economy as well. Roughly 20% of Japan’s total exports are 
sent to China, but they dropped in the first six months of 2019 due to 
China’s economic slowdown from the tariffs, including precision 
equipment maker Ricoh, which shifted production of US-bound products 
from China to Thailand in order to avoid the effects of ongoing tariffs 
(Aichiwa & Nochi, 2019). Mitsubishi Electric and Daikin Industries 
followed a similar strategy, write Aichiwa & Nochi (2019), with 
Mitsubishi moving some of its semiconductor manufacturing and 
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machinery for U.S. customers away from China back to Japan. 
Meanwhile, Japanese analysts confirmed that Daikin turned to Thailand 
to replace China as its production base for compressors used in air 
conditioners. Aichiwa & Nochi predict that there will likely be a greater 
impact on Japanese companies if the U.S. imposes higher tariffs on 
exports from China because the trade sanctions will target smartphones, 
laptop computers and apparel since the crucial electronic parts and 
fabrication devices are supplied by Japanese manufacturers.
     In the spring of 2019, Japanese exports to the U.S. rose 9.6% from a 
year earlier, the seventh straight monthly gain, but shipments to China 
were down 6.3% for the second consecutive month. The global economy 
has had a more negative impact on the Japanese economy than the trade 
war, and Sato (2019) wrote that economists predict modest but sustained 
growth of around 0.5% over the next several years supported by 
improved employment conditions and spending for the 2021 Summer 
Olympic Games. However, on February 4th, 2020, SMBC Nikko 
Securities Inc. data indicated that major Japanese companies, other than 
the finance and utility sectors, will see a 9.6% drop in combined net 
profit for fiscal 2019, primarily affected by the prolonged U.S.-China 
trade conflict and the spread of the coronavirus (the Japan times News, 
2020).  SMBC noted that this was the second consecutive year Japanese 
firms have suffered a drop in profits between the April-December term, 
with the manufacturing sector’s combined net profit to fall by 12.7%  as 
many firms, including automakers, are still affected by the U.S.-China 
trade war and unable to resume operations at their plants in China (The 
Japan Times, 2020).
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7. Potential impact on the world economy
7.1 Consequences of a full-blown trade war, potential winners
　According to the WTO, the US-China trade war directly affects 3% of 
global trade, but the automotive industry accounts for 8% (Bermingham, 
Behsudi, 2019). Concurrently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
stated that the escalation of U.S.-China trade tension was one factor that 
contributed to a “significantly weakened global expansion” in 2018, as 
it cut its 2019 global growth forecast (Cerutti et al., 2019). The IMF 
added that several countries will continue to be indirectly impacted, 
particularly those that are important trade partners with the U.S. and 
China, or play key roles in their supply chains. Cerutti et al (2019) note 
that while the effects on global growth were relatively modest in the first 
half of 2019. The latest tariff escalation significantly impacted business 
and financial market sentiment, disrupted global supply chains, and 
jeopardized the projected recovery of global growth for 2019. Some 
U.S. and Chinese product manufacturers competing in domestic markets 
with imports limited by tariffs, in addition to competing third country 
exporters, may likely be the winners of this tariff war (Cerutti et al., 
2019). 
7.2 Consequences of a full-blown trade war, potential losers
　U.S. and Chinese producers of goods affected by the tariffs, as well as 
producers that use those goods as intermediate inputs, will become 
potential losers of the tariff war. On a global scale, the additional impact 
of the September, 2019 tariffs between the U.S. and China subtracted 
about 3% of global GDP in the short term, with half of this stemming 
from business and market confidence (Cerutti et al., 2019). Failure to 
resolve trade differences and further tariff escalation in other areas such 
as the Chinese automotive parts OEM which spans several countries, 
could further damage global business and financial market sentiment 
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(Figure 6),  negatively 
impacting emerging 
market bond spreads 
and currencies, and 
slow investment and 
trade (Cerutti et al., 
2019). Higher trade 
barriers will disrupt 
global supply chains 
and slow the spread 
of new technologies, 
ultimately lowering 
global productivity 
and welfare, while more import restrictions would also make tradable 
consumer goods less affordable, disproportionately harming low-income 
households (Lagarde, 2019). Lastly, Hossain (2019) warns that imposing 
further tariffs to reduce the trade deficit caused by a surplus of Chinese 
exports to the U.S. is unlikely to be successful because the basic 
drawback in any trade war is there are no ultimate winners. Both 
countries lose their natural, logical and feasible consumption, and 
exporters and importers are shocked due to the reduction in their 
expected volume as business declines (Hossain, 2019). The end 
consequences eventually fall on consumers, who often have to settle for 
lower quality products at higher prices 
8. Conclusion
　The recent ongoing tariff war between the U.S. and China over what 
the U.S. and other WTO members claim to be China’s violations of IPR 
and other technological espionage over the past several decades, is 
expected to continue in the near future. The U.S. 232, 301 and Chinese 
Figure 6 
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retaliatory tariffs have already had significant ramifications on the U.S., 
Chinese, Japanese, and other world economies, while causing serious 
concern about the potential of them triggering the next global economic 
recession after the Covid-19 pandemic. On the other hand, some 
economists believe that President Trump’s implementation of tariffs on 
China have paid off, at least to some degree, in getting the Xi 
administration to abide by what the U.S. and WTO label “proper trade 
practice”, as indicated by the Phase One concessions. Nevertheless, the 
question remaining from this tariff war is whether there will be a winner, 
as China essentially refuses to give in to western pressure while the U.S. 
may continue applying future tariffs on China if it does not comply with 
WTO demands. Still other economists believe that the main underlying 
goal of the tariff measures initiated by the U.S. was to impede China’s 
momentum towards becoming the next world economic leader in 
advanced technology, as stated in its “Made in China 2025” policy. In 
addition to the significant financial losses to import/export, wholesale, 
OEM manufacturers and farmers from both nations, the ultimate 
consequences will trickle down to consumers, who may have little 
choice but to settle for potentially lower quality products at higher 
prices. 
　On a positive note, some economists believe that the tariff war has 
forced U.S. and Chinese manufacturers, distributors, import, export and 
wholesale companies to reduce their dependence on each other and 
diversify their procurement targets. Ivanovitch (2020) states that China 
has begun to significantly dismantle Washington’s economic and 
political leverage over it’s economy, as revealed over the course of 2019 
when it greatly reduced its trade surplus with the U.S. to 16.2% by 
diversifying its trade flows to Southeast Asia and Africa. This made it 
possible to obtain an export growth of 5% in spite of double-digit 
declines in sales to the U.S. (Ivanovitch, 2020). Meanwhile, Reed (2019) 
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claims that U.S. companies such as Google moved production of its 
Pixel smartphone to Vietnam in the Fall of 2019, and will eventually 
move production of most of its hardware bound for the U.S. from China 
to Vietnam over the course of 2020. Home Depot Executive Vice 
President Ted Decker announced the company will move production 
away from China to Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and even 
back to the U.S. (Reed, 2019). President Trump continued his rhetoric to 
U.S. companies throughout 2019 about breaking their dependence on 
China, causing many corporate leaders to rethink about their supply 
chains. Nearly 30% of the 220 respondents from an annual survey 
conducted by the U.S.-China Business Council claimed they had already 
slowed, delayed or cancelled investments in China due to mounting 
trade uncertainty, twice as many as in 2018 (Reed, 2019).
　Economists have not predicted a positive outcome or winner in the 
U.S.-China tariff standoff, but do agree that it was necessary for a leading 
western politician to stand up to China’s IPR violations after many years 
of former leaders averting direct confrontation to preserve the status 
quo. At the beginning of 2020, U.S. consumers began noticing slight 
increases in electronics and commodity prices. This was the result from 
18 months of countless negotiations that introduced foreign technology 
restrictions and several WTO cases leading US-China trade tensions to 
the brink of a full-blown trade war (Wong & Koty, 2020). Wong & Koty 
add that tariffs were put on US$550 billion worth of Chinese products, 
exacerbated by cuts in exports to China for its retaliatory tariffs on 
US$185 billion worth U.S. agriculture products. However, the January 
15th Phase One deal was a significant, positive step for both countries, as 
it not only created a short-term halt to the retaliatory tariff escalation, but 
revealed positive details of the amount the Chinese government will 
purchase of U.S. products and how much the U.S. will reduce tariffs on 
Chinese imports over the next two years. Should China not fulfill its 
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promise to carry out the aforementioned and the Trump administration 
retaliates with further tariffs, the outcome may greatry contribute to the 
next world recession. Nevertheless, history tells us that no matter what 
the U.S. does to impede China’s goal of becoming the next world 
economic leader, it may only have short-term effects. Like all economic 
empires of the past, it is only a matter of time before one nation replaces 
another as the world’s industrial leader, and it looks as though China 
may be well ahead of schedule to do that before 2049 in accordance with 
its 100-year marathon plan.
9. Method
　The aim of this study was to determine the short-and long-term effects 
of the tariff war between the U.S. and China, how it has escalated, and 
the possible scenarios of how it may play out in the near future. In 
addition, the study was done to assess the potential impacts on how the 
trade war may affect world economies under the assumption that it could 
exacerbate into a global economic recession. The first step was to 
ascertain the current economic situation of manufacturing and agriculture 
industries in the U.S., and reveal the impacts they are facing as a result 
of the retaliatory tariffs from China after the Trump administration’s 
implementation of the 301 and 232 tariffs. Data for this paper was 
acquired through interviews with and documents provided by local 
representatives of manufacturing industries, including the MMAC 
(Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce), agriculture 
associations such as the Wisconsin Agriculture Business Association, 
the Dean of the University of Wisconsin Agro-business Department, 
local business people, local farmers, retail store managers, and local 
consumers.  The second step was to determine the impact U.S. consumers 
were feeling as a result of the aforementioned tariffs between the spring 
of 2019 and the time that the latest tariffs were enacted in September, 
　 154 　
国研紀要156 （2020.10）
2019. This was accomplished through interviews with local retail store 
managers and consumers on the U.S. west coast and in the mid-west. 
The third aim was to determine what effects the U.S. tariffs had on the 
Chinese domestic market, in particular, OEM and electronics parts 
manufacturing industries which were hit the hardest by the U.S. tariffs, 
and how they are diversifying their operations both within China and 
abroad. The fourth step was to clarify how China is reacting to 
accusations about their ongoing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
espionage and abuse of foreign patents which the U.S. and other 
members of the WTO claim they have been getting away with for too 
long. This was accomplished through extensive research from various 
periodicals and some information provided by a Chinese source working 
in Beijing who analyzes world economics and finance issues. The author 
also attempted to clarify the Chinese government’s true perception of 
the U.S. under the revelation that it views the country as its number one 
rival. This perception is significantly different from what most U.S. 
politicians and citizens thought after the U.S. government provided 
China with substantial financial, intellectual, and military assistance 
over the past several decades in an effort to help the country become 
more westernized and a major global competitor. Unfortunately, the 
reality is that China has been capitalizing on IPR espionage in an effort 
to strengthening its own State-owned enterprises (SOE)s. The final aim 
was to assess the positive and negative effects that the U.S.–China tariff 
war has had on Japanese and other world economies, and to predict what 
short and long-term ramifications they will have on conventional trade 
partners and the future strategic diversification among them. 
10. Results and Discussion
Findings
　This research on the U.S.-China tariff war helped to clarify what 
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effects the tariffs have had on the Chinese, U.S., Japanese, and other 
nations’ economies, and illustrated why there may be no winner or loser 
in this long-term retaliatory tariff conflict. Despite the alarming 
escalation of tariffs between the two countries over the past two years, 
recent concessions in the January 15th, 2020 phase one discussions 
indicate that China has agreed to increase its purchase of over US$200 
billion worth of agricultural and other goods and services, administer a 
tariff exclusion process plan, and implement intellectual property 
safeguards over the next two years while the U.S. agrees to cut in half 
the September 1st, 2019 tariffs on US$120 billion of imports from 15% 
to 7.5%. If both sides follow through on their promises noted in the 
phase one negotiations, it could halt or at least stall the potential for the 
next world economic recession. 
Further Considerations
　An important question lies in how to acquire current and accurate 
information from China given the backdrop of its rigorous screening 
and blocking of outgoing data concerning its domestic affairs. This may 
be imperative for further research into this ongoing tariff war although 
the Corona virus has put that opportunity to a short-term halt. Further 
speculation about how China’s OEM and electronics manufacturers 
among other industries have evolved over the past year will no doubt be 
a topic worth investigating more thoroughly in the future. It will also be 
important to monitor how the Trump administration uses its tough trade 
rhetoric towards China in an attempt to bolster its image as an authority 
which has stood up to China as the U.S. approaches its next presidential 
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